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Abstract 
Using ownership and control data for 890 firm-years, this paper examines the concentration 
of capital and voting rights in British companies in the second half of the nineteenth century.  
We find that both capital and voting rights were diffuse by modern-day standards. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that there was a modern-style separation of ownership from 
control in Victorian Britain.  One major implication of our findings is  that diffuse ownership 
was present in the UK much earlier than previously thought, and given that it occurred in an 
era with weak shareholder protection law, it somewhat undermines the influential law and 
finance hypothesis.  We also find that diffuse ownership is correlated with large boards, a 
London head office, non-linear voting rights, and shares traded on multiple markets. 
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I 
One of the biggest questions in the history of the modern public company is: When did 
ownership separate from control?  Influenced by the seminal work of Berle and Means, the 
standard view amongst economists is that public companies in the U.S. were early movers, 
with ownership having separated from control at some stage in the early twentieth century, 
whilst other Anglo-Saxon economies experienced a similar transition in the latter part of the 
twentieth century.
2
 A related question in the history of the modern public company is: What 
organisational structures and corporate governance systems were used to finance 
industrialisation?
3
  In particular, to what extent did the legal system and investor protection 
laws facilitate the raising of capital to finance industrialisation?  In this paper, we address 
these big questions in the history of the modern company by analysing corporate ownership 
and control in Britain in the five decades after the liberalisation of incorporation law in 1856.  
At least two things make Britain at this time an ideal place to address these big questions: (a) 
it was the world’s largest capital market and (b) there was a rapid expansion of the equity 
market and democratisation of share ownership.
4
  
Using 890 detailed corporate ownership records, we address three particular questions 
in this paper. The first is when did diffuse ownership emerge in Britain?  Until recently, the 
consensus in the extant literature was that dispersed ownership appeared in Britain at some 
                                                          
2
 Berle and Means, Modern corporation.  Although there have been recent challenges to this view, the Berle and 
Means characterisation of corporate ownership in the U.S. remains the orthodox view amongst economists and 
historians.  See Cheffins and Bank, ‘Myth’; Hannah, ‘Divorce of ownership’; Holderness, ‘Myth of diffuse 
ownership’; Lipartito and Morii, ‘Rethinking the separation’. 
3
 See Hilt, ‘When did ownership separate from control’ and Musacchio, Experiments. 
4
 Grossman, ‘New indices’; Rutterford et al., ‘Who comprised the nation’. 
stage in the second half of the twentieth century.
5
  Foreman-Peck and Hannah, however, have 
shown that ownership was divorced from control for the largest British companies in 1911.
6
 
Our study goes further by showing that dispersed ownership is commonplace at least half a 
century earlier than 1911 and that ownership is dispersed in medium-sized and small 
companies, and not just in the largest.  However, we also find that companies established in 
the 1890s had more concentrated ownership than companies established in earlier periods.  
This finding is consistent with Cheffins et al. and Franks et al. who find that companies 
established around 1900 tended to have concentrated ownership.
7
  
Although we find diffuse ownership and an absence of blockholders in our sample, 
this does not in and of itself mean that we have a modern-day separation of ownership from 
control in Victorian Britain.  The companies in our sample differ from modern companies in 
that they had significantly lower numbers of shareholders, there were no arms-length 
institutional investors, and many of the earlier companies in our sample were not conversions 
of previously established businesses; rather they were new ventures which raised capital from 
the stock market at their inception.
8
 Thus, it is entirely possible that a coalition of the largest 
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 Florence, Ownership; Nyman and Silberston, ‘Ownership’; Scott, ‘Corporate control’; Leech and Leahy, 
‘Ownership structure’; Cheffins, ‘Does law matter’, Corporate ownership; Coffee, ‘Rise’; Roe, ‘Political 
preconditions’; Franks et al., ‘Ownership’. Cheffins, Corporate ownership, pp.157-8 and 231 notes that 
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Moore, ‘Dividend policies’. 
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 Cheffins et al., ‘Ownership dispersion’; Franks et al., ‘Ownership’. 
8
 See Cheffins, Corporate ownership, pp.181-2, who outlines the chronology of stock market flotation in the 
UK, with business concerns launching on the stock market from scratch commonplace before the 1880s, but 
much less so afterwards, when conversions of private companies and partnerships was much more 
commonplace.  
shareholders effectively maintained control of the company.  However, we have no evidence 
which either supports or refutes this possibility.     
Given that ownership was relatively diffuse, we then address the following question: 
was legal protection of investors a precondition for the emergence of the diffusely-owned 
corporation in Britain? The influential law and finance school argue that strong legal 
protection of minority shareholders is a precondition of dispersed ownership.
9
  As Britain had 
a laissez-faire company law regime from the perspective of most minority shareholders in 
non-statutory companies in the nineteenth century, our finding that corporate ownership is 
dispersed is evidence against the law and finance hypothesis.
10
  Our findings in this regard 
concur with recent studies on the history of corporate ownership in other economies.
11
   
The third question which we address in the paper is: What were the correlates or 
potential determinants of ownership structure in Victorian Britain? To examine this issue, we 
use firm-specific data to run a horse race between various hypotheses which have been 
suggested in the literature.  In the corporate finance literature, firm size, and operating 
environment have been identified as potential determinants of ownership structure.
12
  Hilt and 
Musacchio suggest that voting rights which empower small shareholders and limit the power 
of large shareholders are associated with greater ownership diffusion.
13
  In terms of Britain, it 
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 La Porta et al. ‘Law and finance’, ‘Corporate ownership’.  See Musacchio, ‘Law and finance’ for an historical 
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 Hilt, ‘When did ownership separate from control’; Musacchio, Experiments, p. 110-5. 
has been suggested that an official listing contributed to the diffusion of ownership,
14
 as have 
trust and proximity of investors to company headquarters.
15
  In addition to these hypotheses, 
we also test whether having a London headquarters, the number of markets on which a 
company was listed, the denomination of a company’s stock, and board size are correlates of 
ownership structure.  We find no evidence of a relationship between ownership structure and 
size or the nature of a company’s assets and operating environment. We also find that an 
official listing and our proxies for trust are not correlated with ownership concentration.  
However, our results suggest that voting rights, board structure, having a London 
headquarters, and the number of stock markets a company is traded on are related to 
ownership structure.  
This study is significant for at least a further two reasons.  First, several business and 
economic historians have suggested that Britain’s twentieth-century economic decline and 
managerial failure has some of its roots in the concentrated structure of corporate ownership 
which emerged out of the nineteenth century.
16
 Second, if corporate ownership is path 
dependant, as some scholars believe, it is important that we know the structure of ownership 
in the UK at the origin of the modern public company.
17
 
The next section of this paper examines the preconditions for the rise of diffuse 
ownership and the separation of ownership from control.  Section three describes the gradual 
liberalisation of incorporation law in the UK and examines the ownership structure of several 
pre-1856 companies for which ownership data exists.  Section four describes our ownership 
and control data sources.  Section five presents our main findings on the structure of 
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 See Hannah, ‘Divorce of ownership’, p. 414.  See also Cheffins et al., ‘Ownership dispersion’ for an empirical 
test which rejects Hannah’s hypothesis. 
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 Franks et al., ‘Ownership’.  See Cheffins, Corporate ownership, pp.41-43 for a critique. 
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 Chandler, Scale and scope; Elbaum and Lazonick, ‘Decline’. 
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 Bebchuk and Roe, ‘Theory of path dependence’. 
ownership in Victorian Britain.  Section six examines how ownership structure varies across 
industry, our sample period, and voting rights.  Section seven analyses the correlates of 
ownership structure. 
      
II 
Prior to the liberalisation of incorporation law in the nineteenth century, corporate status was 
only available as a privilege extended by Parliament or the Crown e.g., canal companies and 
railways.  Consequently, most other businesses constituted as common-law partnerships.  
Such partnerships have basic economic problems which can hinder the growth of the 
business.
18
 Although the corporate form solves many of these problems, if companies have 
diffuse ownership and ownership is separated from control, agency problems can arise and 
unless these can be sufficiently reduced, investors will be reluctant to invest in firms with 
diffuse ownership.
19
  This raises the following question: what are the preconditions for the 
rise of diffuse ownership and the separation of ownership from control in the first place? 
According to the influential law and finance school, strong legal protection for 
minority shareholders enables ownership to separate from control.
20
 The basic argument is 
that with strong investor protection laws, large shareholders have less fear of expropriation if 
they ever lose control, and are therefore more willing to sell some of their control rights to 
raise funds or diversify their wealth, with the result that corporate ownership becomes 
diffuse.
21
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 La Porta et al., ‘Corporate ownership’, p. 473. 
Coffee, Cheffins, and Franks et al. point out that the pervasive separation of 
ownership from control in the UK, which they reckon occurred at some stage between the 
1930s and 1970s, happened before shareholder protection law was strengthened.
22
 The law 
and finance school has responded to this by arguing that shareholders were well protected in 
Britain for at least two reasons before the dispersion of ownership occurred.
23
   First, the 
UK’s commercial courts had a long history of precedents dealing with fraudulent behaviour 
and had a professional and trustworthy judiciary.  Second, the Directors Liability Act of 1890 
and the Companies Act of 1900 required significant disclosure in prospectuses and held 
directors liable for inaccuracies.   
Although UK commercial courts may have had a long history of professional and 
incorrupt judges setting precedents, common-law judges in Victorian Britain were reluctant 
to interfere in what were perceived to be the internal affairs of companies in order to protect 
the interests of shareholders.
24
 Indeed, judges were ideologically opposed to the notion of 
protecting shareholders because laissez-faire theory and the practice of partnerships taught 
that capitalists could look after themselves.
25
  Such attitudes were clearly demonstrated in the 
precedent set in the famous case of Foss vs. Harbottle, whereby minority shareholders 
brought a case against their company’s directors for alleged wrongdoing and misapplication 
of company resources.
26
  The judge in this case ruled that when a company is allegedly 
wronged by its directors, only the company has a right to sue.  In addition, the judge ruled 
that when a wrong could be ratified by a majority of shareholders, the court would not 
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et al., ‘Ownership’. 
23
 La Porta et al., “Economic consequences,” p.319. 
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 Jefferys, Business organisation, p.394. 
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interfere, implying that individual shareholders could not proceed with an action against the 
company directors.  In other words, this ruling precluded individual shareholders from 
launching a suit on the company’s behalf.  This important precedent strengthened the rights 
of directors and company insiders at the expense of minority shareholders.   
As our sample companies were registered under the 1862 Companies Act and as the 
vast majority of our observations are from before the above-mentioned strengthening of 
shareholder protection legislation at the turn of the twentieth century, we are able to look at 
the dispersion of ownership in an environment with very weak (by modern-day standards) 
shareholder protection.  It is a well-established fact that shareholder protection under the 
1862 Act was minimal.
27
  Until 1900, the anti-director rights index, which measures the 
extent to which company law protects minority shareholders, for companies registered under 
the 1862 Companies Act, was one out of a maximum of six.
28
  In addition, the ex post control 
of self-dealing index, which measures the strength of regulation relating to company 
transactions which involve a director or other insider, was very low by modern-day 
standards.
29
  Furthermore, insider trading was legal and the 1862 Act did not impose a 
compulsory audit upon companies.   
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 Campbell and Turner, ‘Substitutes’. 
28
 Cheffins, Corporate ownership, p. 36.  See La Porta et al. ‘Law and finance’, pp.1126-8 for further 
information on the anti-director rights index.  The 1862 Companies Act provided a list of default provisions for 
company constitutions in Table A of the Act, which correspond to three of the rights in the antidirector rights 
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29
 Cheffins, Corporate ownership, p. 38; See Djankov et al., ‘Law and economics’ on the construction of the 
self-dealing index. 
In summary, Victorian Britain is an ideal laboratory to test the law and finance 
hypothesis regarding corporate ownership, since there was very little shareholder protection 
enshrined in legislation or offered by the commercial courts.  Given this legal environment, 
we should not expect to find dispersed ownership if the law and finance hypothesis holds. 
 
III 
Although the corporate form existed in Britain prior to the nineteenth century, the right to 
incorporate was controlled by Parliament and the Crown, with the common-law courts 
largely hostile to attempts by entrepreneurs to form unincorporated companies.
30
 The 
liberalisation of British incorporation law commenced in the mid-1820s, with the repeal of 
the Bubble Act
31
 and the passage of the Banking Copartnership Act.
32
  Parliament also 
dispensed corporate charters more liberally from the mid-1820s onwards in order to assist the 
growth of capital-intensive transportation and infrastructure projects which provided some 
sort of public good.  Parliament also ended the monopoly in marine insurance in 1824, 
permitting other companies to incorporate.
33
  As a result of this liberalisation, banks, 
insurance companies, and railways dominated the London equity market in 1850, accounting 
for 65.1 per cent of all issues and 80.1 per cent of market capitalisation.
34
  
  Railways typically had diffuse ownership due to their large capital requirements.
35
  In 
addition, many banks and insurance companies would have had diffuse ownership because 
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 Freeman et al., Shareholder democracies; Harris, Industrializing.  See Cheffins, Corporate Ownership, p.150 
for an alternative view. 
31
 6 Geo. IV, c.91. 
32
 7 Geo. IV, c.46. 
33
 Harris, Industrializing, p.211. 
34
 Acheson et al., ‘Rule Britannia’, p.1118. 
35
 Cheffins, Corporate ownership, pp. 157-9. 
there were self-imposed ceilings, usually set at low levels, on the proportion of shares which 
one individual could own.
36
  In order to assess the ownership structure of companies 
established prior to the liberalisation of incorporation law, we searched the National Register 
of Archives to see if any corporate ownership records from this era had survived. However, 
very few ownership records have been preserved.  Table 1 contains the ownership statistics of 
eight companies where we were able to find the necessary ownership records.  The ownership 
statistics reported in Table 1 suggest that the ownership of these five banks, two insurance 
companies, and one major railway was diffuse in that the proportion capital owned by the 
largest shareholder and top five shareholders was relatively low.  
<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE> 
Incorporation law was liberalised further with the passage of the Companies Act of 
1844.
37
 This legislation granted firms the freedom to incorporate as unlimited liability 
companies.  Subsequently, the 1855 and 1856 Limited Liability Acts were passed which 
enabled companies, apart from banks and insurance companies, to incorporate with limited 
liability.
38
 Limited liability was eventually extended to banking in 1858,
39
 and insurance 
companies received this privilege due to their inclusion in the 1862 Companies Act,
40
 which 
was effectively a consolidation of existing pieces of legislation.  The companies incorporated 
under this legislation are the focus of this paper.   
 
IV 
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Our main sources of ownership data are located in the Companies Registration Office files 
held at the National Archives at Kew (BT31 series) and the National Archives of Scotland 
(BT2 series).  Companies registered under the 1856 and 1862 Companies Acts were required 
annually to return a list of their shareholders to the Registrar of Companies.  Up until 1970, 
whenever a company was dissolved either because it was reconstructed, merged or liquidated, 
its ownership records were placed within the Companies Registration Office files.  As the 
vast majority of nineteenth-century companies registered under the 1856 and 1862 
Companies Acts were subsequently dissolved, their ownership records, if they survived, are 
contained within these two BT series.   Notably, as ownership data was not collected by the 
Registrar of Companies on statutory companies set up prior to 1862 (e.g., railways) and 
banks and insurance companies (unless they registered under the 1862 Companies Act), our 
dataset does not contain the largest publicly-traded companies in the Victorian era.      
Our search of the catalogues of the two BT series for public companies which issued 
common stock quoted either in the Course of the Exchange between 1825 and 1870 or in the 
Investor’s Monthly Manual in 1870, 1885, and 1899, returned records for 712 companies.  On 
inspection of these records, 101 contained no ownership returns.  Unfortunately, the 
ownership returns of English companies were extensively weeded by archivists in the past in 
order to reduce the bulk of the files, with the result that only some annual returns have been 
preserved.
41
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 In principle, every first, last and intermediate fifth annual ownership register has been preserved, but in a 
significant minority of cases, we found this not to be the case.  The Scottish records have not been weeded to the 
same extent.   
We collected ownership returns for 1865, 1870, 1883, 1890, and 1900 or one year 
either side of these sample years if the return existed.
42
  If they were available, 1880 or 1881 
were collected in those cases where a company had no returns for 1882-1884.  In addition, we 
collected all returns from the 1850s.  If a company had ownership returns which fell outside 
the selected sample years, we collected a return for each decade between 1860 and 1900, 
where available.   
The ownership returns were usually completed by hand on Form E, a standardised 
return form, which gave a summary of capital and shares i.e., names and holdings of 
shareholders for both ordinary and preference shares.  We photographed 999 returns of Form 
E, which were then inputted manually and verified by data-entry services.  In total, after 
removing firm-years which have missing and unintelligible data, we have ownership returns 
for 890 firm-years, representing 488 unique firms. 
As we are interested in control as well as cash-flow rights, we collected data on each 
company’s voting scales for each year for which they are in our sample from their articles of 
association, Burdett’s Official Intelligence (BOI) and Stock Exchange Official Intelligence 
(SEOI).  These were then used to calculate each shareholder’s voting rights.  In total, we 
found the voting structures of 729 of the 890 firm-years of ownership returns.       
As the ownership returns do not report the membership of the board of directors, we 
obtained the names of directors for the relevant years from articles of association, BOI, SEOI, 
and Stock Exchange Year-book (SEY).  In total, we located director names for 575 out of the 
890 firm-years in our sample.  Each set of ownership returns was then manually scrutinized 
to ascertain the share ownership of each director. 
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 1883 was chosen as this was the year when the second edition of Burdett’s Official Intelligence, which was 
the first stock exchange yearbook in the UK with near-comprehensive director, company data, and market 
information.   
We also collected data on firm age, total paid-up capital, location of head office, share 
qualifications for directors, and nominal and par values of shares from articles of association, 
BOI, and SEOI.  The stock markets where shares were traded were obtained from BOI and 
SEOI for 1883 onwards, with the Investor’s Monthly Manual (IMM) being used for the 1864-
82 period. 
As the source of our ownership data is the files of companies which were dissolved 
before the 1970s, we may be introducing a bias into our sample in that the ownership 
structure of such companies may be different from companies which were not dissolved 
before the 1970s, particularly if dissolution occurred for performance reasons.  Admittedly, 
very few companies established in the nineteenth century were still operating as independent 
entities by the 1970s.  Nevertheless, we checked all our sample companies against the 
Register of Defunct Companies, which lists any company which delisted from the stock 
exchange from 1875 onwards as well as the reason for delisting.
43
  The vast majority of 
sample companies were not dissolved for explicit performance reasons – 55.5 per cent 
reconstructed their capital or merged with another firm.  Only 27.7 per cent of our sample 
companies delisted for explicit performance reasons i.e., they were wound-up voluntarily or 
by court order.        
          <INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> 
From Table 2 we observe the following about our sample.  First, there is a good 
spread of companies across time, with slightly more observations in the 1880s and 1890s, 
which is unsurprising given the expansion of the stock market in these decades.
44
  Second, 
average company size changes little over the sample period, albeit that it is slightly lower in 
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 As a small number of companies were not covered by the Register of Defunct Companies, we used the 
London and Edinburgh Gazettes for these companies.  
44
 Grossman, ‘New indices’. 
the 1860s and slightly higher in the 1900s.  Third, the average number of shareholders rises 
steadily over the sample period, which, taken with the fact that the average par value of firms 
changes little, suggests that ownership may have become more diffused over time.  Fourth, 
the relative size of the companies in our sample compared to all non-railway companies 
traded on the stock market indicates that very few companies in our sample are in the top two 
deciles of companies by par value in any particular year.   
From Table 3, we see that there is a good spread of companies from different 
industries.  The commercial and industrial sector is the largest in the sample, which is 
unsurprising as this was a growth sector in the stock market between 1860 and 1900.
45
  
 
V 
Table 3 contains our first major finding.  We see from the bottom row of Table 3 that 
ownership of Victorian companies was not concentrated either in terms of capital or voting, 
with the mean percentage of capital and voting rights owned by the largest five investors 
being 26.6 and 22.2 per cent.
46
 The Herfindahl Index of ownership and voting, which 
measures how dispersed ownership is across all shareholders, is low compared to similar 
measures for the twentieth century.
47
 In addition, insiders, defined as directors and owners of 
more than 10 per cent of capital, on average owned only 18.5 per cent of capital and 
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 Acheson et al., ‘Rule Britannia’, p.1118-9; Grossman, ‘New indices’, p.130. 
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 Notably, there are no substantial differences in ownership concentration across the various reasons as to why 
companies became defunct, which suggests that our results are not being driven by a performance bias.   
47
 According to Franks et al., ‘Ownership’, pp.4025-6, the mean of the Herfindahl index for their sample of UK 
firms in 1920, 1950, and 1990 was 10.6, 6.3, and 6.3 per cent respectively. 
controlled 16.1 per cent of votes.
48
  Thus, ownership was much more dispersed in Victorian 
Britain than one would expect from the extant literature.  Furthermore, ownership is much 
more diffuse than one would expect given the low level of legal protection for investors. 
<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE> 
Table 4 compares ownership concentration in the UK for the Victorian era with that 
for later periods. Comparability across various ownership studies is not straightforward as 
some report cash flow rights but not voting rights and vice versa.  More fundamentally, 
however, studies which look at the twentieth century focus on the largest companies.  To the 
extent that comparisons can be made, we see that the mean capital held by the largest investor 
was slightly higher in the twentieth century, which indicates that corporate ownership became 
a bit more concentrated during the twentieth century.  In terms of capital, directors in the first 
half of the twentieth century tended to own a smaller proportion of a company’s capital than 
they did in the nineteenth century.  However, the companies in the first half of the twentieth 
century were larger and their voting was more concentrated than their capital because they 
were issued non-voting preference shares.
49
  Notably, the figures for director ownership for 
1990 and 1995, which contain industrial companies of various sizes, are comparable to the 
Victorian era.  Although ownership in our sample is more diffuse than the top 350 companies 
in 2013 in terms of the capital held by the largest and twenty largest investors, directors 
owned greater amounts of capital in the Victorian era than they did in 2013.    
<INSERT TABLE 4 HERE> 
                                                          
48
 10 per cent is chosen to define large shareholders following the usual convention in the extant literature 
(Cheffins et al., ‘Ownership dispersion’; Faccio and Lang, ‘The ultimate ownership’; La Porta et al, ‘Corporate 
ownership’).  
49
 For example, Hannah and Foreman-Peck, ‘Extreme divorce’ find that for the largest 337 British companies in 
1911, the mean percentage of voting rights controlled by directors was 10.1, which is just slightly below the 
mean for our sample. 
Table 5 gives a broader perspective to the concentration of ownership in Victorian 
Britain by comparing it to the capital concentration of constituents of leading stock-market 
indices in 2013.  As can be seen from Table 5, on any measure of capital concentration, 
ownership in Victorian Britain was as diffuse as that in modern large U.S. corporations which 
are in the Dow Jones or S&P 500 indices.  Notably, ownership in Victorian Britain was 
slightly more diffuse than amongst FTSE 100 constituents in 2013.  Given that the companies 
in our ownership sample were nearly all outside the largest 100 companies in Victorian 
Britain, a more meaningful comparison would be with those indices for the U.S. and UK 
which contain medium-sized companies i.e., the S&P 400 of Mid Cap stocks, the S&P 600 of 
Small Cap stocks, and the FTSE 250.  Compared to companies in these indices, companies in 
Victorian Britain were much less likely to have a single owner holding more than 10 per cent 
of shares.  The average proportion of capital held by the largest investor and largest five 
investors in Victorian Britain is smaller than in modern-day medium-sized U.S. firms and is 
substantially smaller than in modern-day UK firms.   
<INSERT TABLE 5 HERE> 
Some caveats need to be placed on comparisons of ownership between the Victorian 
and the modern periods, particularly with respect to historical context. First, the share 
registers of large companies in the twenty-first century have hundreds of thousands of 
shareholders, whereas the average share register of our mid-cap Victorian companies 
contained 410 shareholders (Table 2).  Second, as can be seen from Table 4, on average, 
72.54 per cent of capital in the top 350 companies in 2013 is owned by the 20 largest 
shareholders, but most of these are large asset managers or institutional shareholders who are 
not involved in corporate governance, with the result that these companies can be 
characterised by a separation of ownership from control.
50
 By way of contrast, in the case of 
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Victorian Britain, the twenty largest shareholders would have been individuals, and Table 4 
reveals that, on average, 47.27 per cent of capital in our sample of Victorian companies is 
owned by the 20 largest shareholders.  Consequently, one has to ask whether in this historical 
context it is appropriate to characterise such companies as having a modern-style separation 
of ownership and control. Florence in his 1961 study of corporate ownership argued that a 
‘small coherent “resolute” group’ of individuals could effectively maintain control of the 
company despite ownership being diffuse.
51
  However, there is no evidence available on our 
sample companies as to the existence or otherwise of such small resolute groups.  
It could be argued that directorial share ownership requirements, which were often 
included in the articles of association of Victorian companies,
52
 could have been used to keep 
effective control in the hands of a small number of individuals by excluding most 
shareholders from board membership.  Although the average directorial qualifications in our 
sample was 0.5 per cent of the company’s par value, directorial requirements were set low 
enough that, on average, 29.3 per cent of shareholders had enough shares to become 
directors, which suggests that directorial qualifications were not a means for a resolute group 
of large shareholders to secure control. 
Although the companies in our sample may have lacked blockholders and active 
governance from large shareholders, this does not imply that they had a modern-style 
separation of ownership and control since shareholders, small and large, may have had more 
incentive to be active.  Firstly, the cost of being an active shareholder may have been much 
lower in the Victorian context as many shareholders lived in the vicinity of the company’s 
headquarters or operations.  Secondly, illiquid capital markets meant that it was more 
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difficult for investors to perform the Victorian version of the ‘Wall Street Walk’, making 
them less likely to be passive investors. Thus, it is entirely possible, that small shareholders in 
our era were not passive, unlike their twenty-first-century counterparts.     
<INSERT TABLE 6 HERE>  
The results presented in this section illustrate that Victorian companies had dispersed 
ownership by modern standards. However, there are important caveats to this conclusion. The 
identity of large shareholders has changed over time with passive financial institutions and 
asset managers being more prevalent now. In addition, if the largest twenty shareholders in a 
particular firm had been willing and able to form a coalition, they would generally have 
controlled a substantial interest in that firm. 
 
VI 
As can be seen from Table 3, the low concentration of ownership and voting in Victorian 
Britain is not being driven by one or two industries.  All industries in Table 3 can be 
described more or less as having diffuse ownership.  The most diffuse sector in terms of 
capital concentration is banking and in terms of voting concentration, banking is joined by 
insurance and finance companies as the least concentrated.   
Banking, finance, and insurance companies typically structured their articles of 
association to ensure that they had diffuse ownership by restricting the amount of shares any 
one investor could own and / or by skewing their voting scales in favour of small investors.
53
  
One reason for doing so was that such companies usually had uncalled capital or extended 
liability, and depositors and policy-holders with these companies may have preferred to see 
the company’s shares dispersed amongst many owners because there was less risk of many 
owners becoming bankrupt as compared to a few owners.    
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As can be seen from Table 3, breweries are at the other end of the ownership 
concentration spectrum.  From 1870 onwards, breweries converted to public limited 
companies because of increased capital needs arising from technological changes which 
increased the optimal size of breweries and the need for breweries to secure public houses 
following regulatory changes in the licensing of public houses.
54
  Unlike many other sectors 
in Table 3, the breweries were well-established businesses before they came to market and 
their original owners had a desire to maintain as much control as possible once their firms 
went public.
55
           
 Table 7 enables us to see whether capital and voting concentration change over time 
and as companies mature.  The first thing to note from Table 7 is that capital and voting 
concentration decline over time.  This suggests that capital and voting rights become more 
diffuse as companies mature, indicating that the secondary trading of shares may have led to 
reduced ownership concentration.   
<INSERT TABLE 7 HERE> 
The second point of note from Table 7 is that as the nineteenth century progresses, the 
initial concentration of ownership and voting rights increases so that by the 1890s, the five 
largest investors on average have 43.8 per cent of capital and 42.9 per cent of voting rights, 
whereas in the 1860s the equivalent figures were 33.0 and 22.8 respectively.  The third thing 
to note is that voting rights are slightly less concentrated than capital over most of the sample 
period.  However, companies established in the 1890s appear to have more concentrated 
voting rights than capital by the 1900s. 
The question arises as to why ownership is much more concentrated for companies 
establishing in the final decade of our sample period.  One possibility is that the companies 
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establishing in the 1890s are smaller.  However, the opposite is the case.  Another possibility 
is that the cohort is dominated by one industry.  No one industry dominates, but even if we 
remove the industry with the highest concentration (breweries), ownership is still much more 
concentrated for companies establishing in the 1890s.  In the SEOI and BOI, the companies in 
our sample incorporated in the 1890s were mainly described as being “registered” whereas in 
previous decades in our sample, the vast majority of companies are described as 
“established”.  In other words, what is different about the companies going public in the 
1890s is that they are conversions to public company status of established firms which were 
previously constituted as partnerships.  Given this trend in the 1890s, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that Chandler viewed many British industrial companies at the turn of the 
twentieth century as being family-controlled enterprises which were “personally managed”.56           
 As can be seen from Table 8, which shows how voting rights evolved over time, early 
in the sample period most companies had voting scales which penalised large investors, with 
the result that voting rights were more dispersed than capital.  In other words, many 
companies had voting scales which placed a cap on the maximum number of votes which any 
one investor could have and / or had a graduated voting scale skewed against large owners 
(e.g., 5-10 shares = 1 vote; 10-25 = 2 votes; 25-50 shares = 3 votes; 50-100 shares = 4 votes; 
100-200 shares = 5 votes; and one vote for every additional 200 hundred shares). As can be 
seen from Table 8, these types of scale became less common amongst companies established 
in the 1870s and 1880s, and by the 1890s only 19.1 per cent of companies in our sample 
operated such voting scales.  In other words, the majority of companies established in the 
second half of our sample period operated linear voting schemes i.e., one-share-one-vote 
schemes or x-shares-one-vote schemes.      
<INSERT TABLE 8 HERE> 
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The existence of non-voting preference shares concentrates voting rights to ordinary 
shareholders, making voting rights relatively more concentrated than capital.
57
  As can be 
seen from Table 8, preference shares were not used much by companies established in the 
1850s, 1860s, or 1870s, but they were increasingly popular amongst companies established in 
the 1880s, and were particularly popular with companies established in the 1890s.  The 
popularity of preference shares amongst these companies explains why voting rights were 
more concentrated than capital for companies established in the latter part of our sample 
period.     
 Table 9, which partitions our sample by voting structure, shows that the presence of 
voting scales skewed against large owners meant that voting was much less concentrated than 
capital in those companies.  For example, insiders in such companies had, on average, 17.3 
per cent of capital, but only 10.2 per cent of votes. The presence of preference shares and 
regular voting scales meant that voting rights were much more concentrated than capital.  For 
example, insiders in firms with linear voting scales and preference shares had, on average, 
20.3 per cent of capital, but controlled 28.8 per cent of votes.  This suggests one possible 
supply-side reason as to why preference shares were issued.  Many of the companies which 
went public from about the 1890s onwards were conversions of long-established partnerships 
or private companies and the original owners, whilst wanting to raise capital from the public, 
wished to maintain effective control of their companies.  The best way to achieve this end 
was to issue non-voting preference shares.  On the demand side, the rise of preference shares 
was driven by the rise of middle-class investors interested in a regular fixed income, but not 
in the governance of a particular company.
58
 
                                                          
57
 Some preference shares at this time had voting rights attached to them, but we only have eight firm-years in 
our sample where there were preference shares which had voting rights. 
58
 Jefferys, Business organisation, p.216. 
<INSERT TABLE 9 HERE> 
 
VII 
In general, ownership structure was diffuse in Victorian Britain, but there was a wide 
variation in ownership structure across sample firms, which raises the question as to the 
correlates and ultimately the potential determinants of ownership structure. In this section, we 
explore econometrically the correlates of ownership structure in our sample.   
Size is usually regarded as an important determinant of ownership structure.
59
  Large 
firms have a need for larger capital resources, implying that the value of a given fraction of 
ownership will be higher, reducing capital concentration.  We use company par value as 
proxy for size. 
According to Demsetz and Lehn, companies located in an industry where it is difficult 
to assess and monitor managerial performance should have more concentrated ownership.
60
  
Given the asymmetric information problems endemic in financial institutions, one might 
expect more concentrated ownership in this industry.  In addition, the information 
asymmetries between managers and shareholders would be large in the mining industry given 
that many mines were located overseas or far away from stock markets.  On the other hand, 
utilities, which were usually local monopolies characterised by stable prices, technology and 
market share, should have more diffuse ownership.  We use industry dummies to test these 
conjectures. 
As Hilt and Musacchio have suggested that voting rights potentially determine 
ownership structure, we use two binary variables to capture whether voting rights which 
discriminate against or empower large shareholders are correlated with ownership 
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concentration.
61
  The first binary variable takes account of whether a firm has issued non-
voting preference shares, whilst the second takes account of whether a company has a non-
linear voting structure. 
 Hannah has hypothesised that having a prestigious official listing contributed to the 
diffusion of ownership because of the two-thirds rule.
62
 We test this hypothesis by creating a 
binary variable which takes the value one if a company was on the official list of the stock 
exchange, zero otherwise.  As some scholars have claimed that trust and the proximity of 
investors to company headquarters resulted in ownership diffusion occurring in Britain, we 
also create a variable which attempts to capture the proximity of shareholders as a body to the 
company headquarters.
63
 As Britain had multiple regional stock exchanges in the Victorian 
era, we exploit this fact to create a variable which measures the distance between a 
company’s headquarters and the main stock exchange where its shares were traded.     
We also test a few additional hypotheses.  As some companies in Victorian Britain 
had their shares traded on more than one stock market, we expect that the greater the number 
of stock exchanges a company was traded on, the less concentrated was its ownership. We 
also expect companies with a head office in London to have more diffuse ownership, since 
they potentially have access to a larger capital market and number of investors.  
Campbell and Turner and Foreman-Peck and Hannah find that larger boards in the 
Victorian and Edwardian periods are associated with better performing companies, which 
could be interpreted as larger boards alleviating the agency problems that are associated with 
diffuse ownership, since the greater the number of directors, the greater the cost of collusion 
with executive directors and the greater the degree of mutual monitoring conducted by 
                                                          
61
 Hilt, ‘When did ownership separate from control’; Musacchio, Experiments, p. 110-5. 
62
 Hannah, ‘Divorce of ownership’. 
63
  Franks et al., ‘Ownership’. 
directors.
64
 In addition, the existence of directorial share qualifications in most companies 
meant that the greater the number of directors, the greater the incentives of directors to 
monitor company executives.
65
 We therefore explore the correlation between board size and 
ownership structure. 
   Uncalled capital, whereby a proportion of a company’s capital remained unpaid, 
was a common feature of stocks in this era.
66
 The presence of uncalled capital could 
potentially result in more diffuse ownership as investors are reluctant to take large stakes 
because of the liability which is attached to share ownership or it could result in concentrated 
ownership as it lowers the costs of monitoring co-owners to ensure that they have adequate 
wealth to pay potential calls.
67
 We therefore test whether the amount of uncalled capital was 
correlated with ownership concentration.    
As companies had a wide range of share denominations in this era (see Appendix 
Table 2), we examine whether denomination was correlated with ownership concentration, 
since the affordability of shares might be an important determinant of ownership dispersion.  
The dependent variables in our multivariate regressions are the logs of the percentage 
of capital and voting rights held by insiders, the percentage of capital and voting rights held 
by largest five shareholders, and the Herfindahl index of capital and voting rights.  As well as 
the various independent variables mentioned above, we control for the ultimate fate of the 
company to ensure that the results are not being driven by a performance bias.  We also 
control for the establishment date of the company, the date of the ownership census, and the 
size of a company’s directorial share qualification.  Variable definitions and data sources are 
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reported in Appendix Table 1 and summary statistics are in Appendix Table 2. The results 
from Ordinary Least Squares regressions are reported in Table 10 and these results are robust 
to the use of panel specifications with random effects. In our regression analysis, we only 
show correlations between variables and our results do not imply causality.   
<INSERT TABLE 10> 
As can be seen from Table 10, there is little statistical or economic relationship 
between ownership structure and firm size.  Notably, Hilt and Musacchio also find that size 
and ownership structure are unrelated.
68
 One explanation for this finding is that as one of the 
main benefits of incorporating is that ownership can be separated from control, one should 
not expect firm size to be an important determinant of ownership structure. Another 
explanation is that the amount of capital or votes controlled by insiders was almost 
immaterial from the point of view of actual control of the company. Yet another possibility is 
that many of the early firms in our sample were set up with no blockholders, unlike modern-
day firms and unlike firms towards the end of our sample period.  Therefore, whether big or 
small, companies had dispersed ownership.  
The industry binary variables in Table 10 reveal that industries in Victorian Britain, 
where it was more difficult to assess and monitor managerial performance (e.g., mining and 
financial companies), do not have more diffuse ownership than companies where it is easier 
to assess managerial performance (e.g., utilities). This goes against Demsetz and Lehn’s 
view.  Indeed, financial institutions have much more diffuse ownership than other sectors.  
One possibility could be that the financial sector was regulated or monitored by the 
government, thus ensuring trust in this sector.
69
  However, this sector faced no regulation 
until well into the twentieth century.  A more likely possibly is that this result arises from the 
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fact that some banks and insurance companies limited the amount of shares that any one 
individual could own.      
The two variables which attempt to capture the voting structures of companies 
(NonVotePreference and VotingNonLinear) reveal that neither has an effect on capital 
concentration (specifications 1 to 3), but that the presence of voting schemes which 
discriminate against large investors results in less concentrated voting rights (specifications 4 
to 6), which is consistent with the findings reported in the previous section and those of Hilt 
and Musacchio.   
The regression results also suggest that there is no correlation between being on the 
Official List and ownership concentration, which raises a question about the role played by 
official listing requirements in separating ownership from control.
70
    
Four of the six coefficients in specifications 1 to 6 on the LocalMiles variable are 
statistically significant, and each of these coefficients is positive but very small in an 
economic sense. This finding suggests that the proximity of investors to a company is not 
closely related with ownership structure, which is inconsistent with the notion that trust may 
be higher amongst investors living in proximity to companies and their directors.  
As can be seen from the negative and statistically significant coefficient on the 
NumMarkets variable, the greater the number of markets a company’s shares were traded on, 
the less concentrated was its capital and voting, which is consistent with our expectation.    
The results in Table 10 also reveal that companies with a head office in London tended to 
have less capital and voting concentrated in the hands of insiders and less capital and voting 
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concentrated in the hands of the top five shareholders, which again is consistent with our 
priors.   
Unsurprisingly, specifications 1 and 4 in Table 10 reveal that the greater the number 
of directors, the more concentrated is the percentage of capital and votes controlled by 
insiders (i.e., directors and large shareholders).  However, the results in specifications 2, 3, 5 
and 6 of Table 10 reveal that the greater the number of board members, the lower is the 
concentration of capital and voting as measured by the percentage held by the largest five 
investors and the Herfindahl index, which is consistent with our prior expectations.   
As can be seen from Table 10, the presence of uncalled capital is uncorrelated with 
ownership structure.  In addition, the coefficient on the ParValue variable suggests that the 
denomination of shares is not correlated with ownership concentration.
71
  In other words, 
neither the character nor denomination of shares mattered for ownership concentration.  
There are positive and statistically significant coefficients on the DirQualScale 
variable.  As the average director qualification in our regression analysis was 0.4 per cent of 
paid-up capital (Appendix Table 2), this result is largely an artefact of the qualifications.  
However, this is not to suggest that the presence of qualifications inspired trust in the 
company by aligning incentives of directors with shareholders.   
As there is a suggestion in the literature that company promoters designed company 
bylaws not necessarily to have dispersed ownership, but simply to have a large number of 
shareholders, we examine the effect of our various independent variables on the log of the 
number of shareholders (see specification 7 of Table 10).
72
  Notably, voting regimes which 
discriminated against large shareholders and the presence of preference shares had no bearing 
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on the number of shareholders.  Most other independent variables have the expected sign, but 
surprisingly an official listing is correlated with a lower number of shareholders.     
The statistically significant positive coefficients on the EstablishmentDate variable in 
Table 10 confirms our earlier findings that older firms have lower capital and voting 
concentration. The statistically significant negative coefficients on the OwnershipDate 
variable indicate that ownership becomes less concentrated as the nineteenth century 
progresses.  
In summary, the main findings from our regressions are that the diffusion of 
ownership was correlated with having a head office in London as well as the listing of shares 
on numerous regional stock exchanges. In addition, board size also seems to have played a 
role in facilitating the diffusion of ownership.  Non-linear voting rights, which penalised 
large investors, were also associated with lower levels of voting concentration.   
 
 
VIII 
 
The main findings of this paper are fourfold.  First, relative to modern-day standards for large 
publicly-traded companies, never mind medium-sized and small companies, Victorian Britain 
had dispersed ownership, with ownership being separated from control. If one believes that 
separating ownership from control is one of the definitive features of the corporation, this 
finding is, in one sense, not that surprising.  However, for reasons outlined above, one needs 
to be circumspect in ascribing a modern-style separation of ownership and control to public 
companies in Victorian Britain.   
Second, given the limited shareholder protection afforded by the 1862 Companies 
Act, the dispersed nature of ownership in this period is evidence against the law and finance 
hypothesis, which argues that strong investor protection law is a prerequisite for dispersed 
ownership.  This raises a question as to why dispersed ownership was commonplace. A 
combination of factors may have played a role.  Capital market discipline, investors demand 
for nearly all earnings to be paid out as dividends, and local stock exchanges may have also 
played a role in the rise of dispersed ownership.
73
  Another possibility is that diffuse 
ownership was possible as ownership did not fully separate from control, because coalitions 
of shareholders controlled companies. This possibility needs to be explored in future work. 
Third, we find that ownership structure was correlated with several factors. A diffuse 
ownership structure was more likely to be found in companies which had larger boards, a 
head office in London, non-linear voting scales, and shares traded on more than one stock 
market.  
Fourth, although concentration of ownership tended to erode within each cohort over 
time, companies formed in the 1890s had greater capital and voting concentration than those 
formed in earlier decades, and, unlike companies formed in earlier decades, the insiders in 
these companies were able to maintain their voting rights.  Future research should focus on 
why this turn happened and the long-run effect of it on the UK’s corporate economy.          
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Table 1. Ownership diffusion of several companies, 1821-45 
Company Year Capital held by largest 
shareholder  
(%) 
Capital held by largest 
five shareholders  
(%) 
Bradford Banking Company 1827 1.5 7.3 
Great Western Railway 1843 1.6 5.8 
Guardian Insurance Company 1821 0.3 1.3 
Guardian Insurance Company 1845 0.3 1.3 
Hampshire Banking Company 1835 4.4 18.9 
Royal Exchange Assurance 1838 2.3 9.7 
Sheffield and Hallamshire Bank 1836 2.0 9.8 
Union Bank of Scotland 1841 4.4 14.0 
Ulster Banking Company 1836 1.0 5.2 
Sources: HSBC Archives, Deed of Copartnership of Bradford Banking Company; National Archives, RAIL 251/28, 38 and 
50, Great Western Railway holders of £100, £50 and £20 shares 1843; Lloyds-TSB Archives, 1085, Hampshire Banking 
Company Shareholders’ Register: London Metropolitan Archive, CLC/B/107/ms18093.01-03, Guardian Shareholder 
Register 1821, 1845; London Metropolitan Archive, CLC/B/107/MS16233/001-002, Royal Exchange Assurance 
Shareholder Register 1838; HSBC Archives, 598/1-2, Share Registers of Sheffield and Hallamshire Bank, volumes 1 and 2: 
HBOS Archive, NRA 1110/1/24/14, Union Banking Company, List of Shareholders, 1841: Public Record Office of 
Northern Ireland, D/3499/CA/1, Ulster Banking Company Register of Shareholders. 
  
Table 2.  Sample summary statistics  
 
Relative size of companies compared to 
all non-railway companies in Investor’s Monthly Manual 
 
  
Year 
Top 
10% 
Top 
20% 
Top 
50% 
Bottom 
50% 
Total  
companies 
in sample 
 
Average 
company 
size 
£(000)s 
Average 
number of 
shareholders  
1853-1868 - - - - 144 154.1 312.4 
        
1869-1879 7 16 52 79 131 211.0 333.5 
1880-1889 12 25 104 159 263 210.4 373.4 
1890-1899 1 14 77 139 216 220.3 464.7 
1900-1902 2 9 34 84 118 244.3 594.9 
        
Total 1869-1902 22 64 267 461 728 218.9 429.2 
Total 1853-1902     872 208.2 409.9 
Missing Par     18  458.0 
Whole sample     890  410.9 
Source: Investor’s Monthly Manual, 1868-1902, which was available from the International Center for Finance at Yale 
University.  See text for sources of shareholder numbers. 
Notes: As the many railways traded on British stock markets were large, their inclusion in this table would mean that there 
would be fewer of our sample companies in the top two deciles or the top half of the size distribution of public companies.  
Two shareholder returns for 1853 are included in our sample as these had been preserved in the archives.  These were 
companies formed under the 1844 Companies Act which subsequently registered under the 1862 Companies Act.  The 
relative size of companies compared to non-railway companies is the average of the yearly figures.  Company size is 
measured in terms of the par value of its equity.  There are 18 of the 890 firm years for which we do not have accurate data 
on their par value. 
Table 3.  Average capital and voting concentration by industry 
  
 
Capital concentration  
 
Voting concentration 
     
 
N 
 
% held 
by  
Insiders 
 
 
% held by  
Largest 5 
Investors 
 
Herfindahl 
Index (%) 
 
 
% held 
by  
Insiders 
 
% held by  
Largest 5 
Investors 
 
Herfindahl 
Index (%) 
         Banks 140 11.7 16.1 1.3 
 
9.3 11.6 1.1 
Breweries 35 26.1 40.7 7.6 
 
33.7 39.7 9.3 
Commercial and 
Industrial 
231 23.1 32.0 4.8 
 
20.1 26.9 4.7 
Docks 2 34.7 37.9 3.9 
 
29.3 35.3 3.6 
Finance 29 16.3 23.3 2.6 
 
12.0 14.9 1.5 
Gas and Light 36 15.4 22.9 3.0 
 
14.3 19.0 3.2 
Insurance 50 17.1 22.3 3.7 
 
10.9 11.9 1.1 
Iron, Coal and Steel 65 20.9 33.8 5.7 
 
19.0 30.2 4.5 
Mines 47 17.6 27.3 3.7 
 
12.2 21.2 2.9 
Mortgage and Finance 73 14.2 22.8 3.2 
 
11.9 18.5 2.5 
Spinning and Weaving 35 23.5 22.1 2.4 
 
21.4 24.8 3.0 
Steamships 37 19.1 26.5 4.7 
 
20.5 26.0 5.3 
Tea and Coffee 15 12.9 32.7 4.0 
 
6.8 21.7 2.2 
Telegraph 18 22.3 31.5 7.1 
 
13.8 22.4 5.1 
Tramways 19 14.8 23.4 4.9 
 
11.6 20.3 3.9 
Wagon 14 20.5 25.4 2.8 
 
17.6 22.7 2.5 
         
Total 846 18.5 26.6 3.9 
 
16.1 22.2 3.5 
         
Source: see text. 
Notes: Number of observations varies per measure depending on data availability. 
 
  
Table 4.  Capital and voting concentration in Britain, 1855-2013 
 
  % held by largest investor % held by 20 largest investors % held by directors 
Years N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1853-1880 95 12.17(c) 8.37(c) 56.20(c) 57.60(c) 18.22(c) 12.67(c) 
1881-1902 480 10.14(c) 6.35(c) 45.51(c) 43.04(c) 12.78(c) 9.05(c) 
1853-1902 575 10.48(c) 6.63(c) 47.27(c) 44.30(c) 13.68(c) 9.45(c) 
1911 337 - - - - 6.61(c) 2.45(c) 
1936 92 16.27(v) 9.80(v) 40.47(v) 34.20(v) 9.83(c) 2.85(c) 
1951 98 13.02(v) 5.50(v) 30.67(v) 21.00(v) 6.53(c) 1.15(c) 
1983 470 15.86(c) - 60.47(c) - - - 
1990 225 - - - - 12.91(c) 6.27(c) 
1995 802 18.82 (c) - - - 13.02 (c) - 
2013 350 17.49(c) 13.26(c) 72.54(c) 73.36(c) 3.85(c) 0.41(c) 
Sources: For the 1853-1902 data see text.  The 1911 data consist of the largest 337 companies from that year 
and is from the online web appendix to Foreman-Peck and Hannah, ‘Extreme divorce’.  The 1936 and 1951 
figures are based on data from the statistical appendix in Florence, Ownership, pp. 196-217.  Florence’s 1936 
and 1951 samples contain all non-financial and non-conglomerate companies with an issued share capital in 
excess of £3m in 1951.  The 1983 data are from Leech and Leahy, ‘Ownership structure’, 1428.  Their sample 
consists of 470 UK-listed companies from a range of industries, with 325 coming from The Times 1000 largest 
industrial companies. The 1990 data are from Short and Keasey, ‘Managerial ownership’, p. 91.  Their sample 
consists of 225 industrial companies on the London Stock Exchange official list.  The 1995 data are from Davies 
et al., ‘Ownership structure’, p. 651.  Their sample consists of 802 non-financial companies.  The 2013 data are 
from authors’ calculations based on data from Bloomberg for the largest 350 companies traded on the London 
Stock Exchange.  
Notes: Capital (c) and voting (v) concentration.  The sample size for the 1853-1902 data is limited to those 
companies where we have information on director ownership data. 
  
Table 5.  Capital concentration of companies in market indices in 2013  
       
 
% of 
companies 
with a single 
shareholder 
owning more 
than 10% 
 
 % held by largest 
investor  
% held by 5 largest 
investors 
 
 
 Median Mean 
 
Median Mean 
         
Dow Jones 20.0   7.1 9.6  24.6 27.4 
S&P 500 37.3   8.6 10.3  30.9 32.5 
FTSE 100 50.5   10.0 16.0  28.9 35.5 
DAX 30 51.7   10.9 16.2  30.8 32.0 
S&P MidCap 400 51.8   10.2 11.3  34.1 35.7 
CAC 40 57.9   11.7 18.7  31.0 33.7 
S&P SmallCap 600 60.3   10.8 12.5  37.8 39.1 
FTSE 250 75.1   14.1 18.1  40.3 43.8 
S&P Asia 77.6   18.0 25.2  38.1 42.1 
MDAX 79.2   25.8 32.9  45.4 49.3 
Ibovespa  81.0   22.3 25.6  50.4 49.7 
CAC Mid 60 88.3   29.8 33.6  54.1 50.5 
         
Victorian Britain 35.6 
 
 6.8 10.5  21.5 26.6 
         
Source: Bloomberg and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: The Dow Jones consists of 30 large US corporations.  The S&P 500 is an index of 500 large US corporations, the S&P 
MidCap 400 is an index of 400 midcap US corporations, and the S&P SmallCap 600 is an index of 600 smallcap US 
corporations.  The FTSE 100 is an index of the 100 largest companies traded on the London Stock Exchange, whereas the 
FTSE 250 consists of companies ranked 101 to 350 in terms on size on the London market.  The DAX 30 consists of 30 major 
German companies trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and the MDAX consists of 50 German companies (excluding 
technology companies) just outside the top 30 German companies.  The CAC 40 consists of the 40 most significant companies 
traded on the Paris Bourse and the CAC Mid 60 is a midcap index for the Paris Bourse, which consists of the 60 largest 
companies outside of the top 60 companies.  The S&P Asia consists of 50 large companies drawn from Hong Kong, Singapore, 
South Korea, and Taiwan.  The IBovespa consists of the top 50 companies traded on the São Paulo Stock Exchange.   
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Table 6.  Summary statistics of capital and voting concentration (%) 
  
Companies 
Average 
no. per 
company 
Mean St. dev. Min. Median Max. 
Panel A: Capital concentration 
Herfindahl 846  3.9 6.3 0.1 1.8 83.7 
        
% held by largest 
       
 
Investor 846 
 
10.5 10.7 0.4 6.8 91.3 
 
5 investors 846 
 
26.6 17.0 1.9 21.5 98.7 
 
10 investors 846 
 
36.8 19.4 3.9 32.4 100.0 
 
20 investors 846 
 
49.1 21.2 7.8 46.0 100.0 
         % held by insiders (all companies for which director and capital data available) 
 
just directors (a) 575 5.8 8.8 6.2 0.0 7.3 44.7 
 
just large shareholder (b) 575 0.3 4.8 11.9 0.0 0.0 86.5 
 
both director and large sh (c) 575 0.3 4.9 12.8 0.0 0.0 91.3 
 
insider (a+b+c) 575 6.4 18.5 17.9 0.8 12.2 98.0 
         
Panel B: Voting concentration 
Herfindahl 729  3.5 8.1 0.0 1.4 100.0 
        
% held by largest 
       
 
Investor 729 
 
8.6 11.6 0.0 4.9 100.0 
 
5 investors 729 
 
22.2 18.2 0.2 17.3 100.0 
 
10 investors 729 
 
31.1 20.7 0.5 26.7 100.0 
 
20 investors 729 
 
42.6 22.6 1.0 40.5 100.0 
         % held by insiders (all companies for which director and voting data available) 
 
just director (a) 559 5.9 8.0 6.3 0.0 6.2 34.4 
 
just large shareholder (b) 559 0.2 3.7 11.7 0.0 0.0 100.0 
 
both director and large sh (c) 559 0.2 4.3 13.3 0.0 0.0 91.3 
 
insider (a+b+c) 559 6.3 16.1 18.4 0.5 9.0 100.0 
         
         
Source: see text. 
Notes: 44 of our firm-years have multiple classes of shares (i.e., ordinary and preference shares) where it has proved impossible 
to match up shareholder names of different classes in order to work out capital concentration for all 890 firm-years.  However, 
we can calculate the concentration of voting rights for such firms, provided we have the company’s voting scale. The 
Herfindahl Index is the sum of the squared proportion of capital owned by each investor in a company. Large shareholders are 
defined as those who own more than 10 per cent of capital in a firm for capital data or 10 per cent of votes for voting data.  
Insiders are defined as directors plus owners with more than 10 per cent of capital.   
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Table 7.  Capital and voting concentration by establishment date and ownership census date 
Panel A: Capital concentration 
  % of capital owned by 5 largest investors    Number of observations 
  Decade in which ownership census taken    Decade in which ownership census taken 
 
 
1850s 1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s Total 
   
1850s 1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s Total 
 
                 
Decade in 
which 
company 
established 
<=1850s 20.1 20.4 20.2 17.8 10.5 12.1 16.2 
  
<=1850s 8 15 13 38 21 20 115 
1860s . 33.0 30.1 26.2 24.8 23.9 29.1 
  
1860s 0 105 66 64 47 16 298 
1870s . . 33.5 26.9 25.0 19.9 25.9 
  
1870s 0 0 16 72 47 24 159 
1880s . . . 31.3 26.9 19.7 27.0 
  
1880s 0 0 0 52 52 30 134 
1890s . . . . 43.8 32.7 38.5 
  
1890s 0 0 0 0 23 21 44 
 
                  
 Overall 20.1 31.4 29.3 26.2 26.1 21.4 26.6 
  
Overall 8 120 95 226 190 111 750 
Panel B: Voting concentration 
  % of voting rights controlled by 5 largest investors 
   
Number of observations 
  Decade in which ownership census taken    Decade in which ownership census taken 
 
 
1850s 1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s Total 
   
1850s 1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s Total 
 
                  
Decade in 
which 
company 
established 
<=1850s 12.2 10.6 6.8 10.1 8.8 7.4 9.2 
  
<=1850s 5 12 10 35 21 19 102 
1860s . 22.8 23.5 21.0 19.3 21.4 21.9 
  
1860s 0 98 61 68 46 15 288 
1870s . . 26.5 23.7 22.4 17.5 22.8 
  
1870s 0 0 16 68 43 18 145 
1880s . . . 29.4 24.7 20.8 25.5 
  
1880s 0 0 0 50 50 32 132 
1890s . . . . 42.9 41.4 42.3 
  
1890s 0 0 0 0 26 21 47 
 
                  
 Overall 12.2 21.5 22.2 22.0 23.6 22.0 22.3 
  
Overall 5 110 87 221 186 105 714 
Source: see text. 
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Table 8.  Percentage of companies with particular voting structures by decade in which 
company was established 
    
Decade in which  
firm established 
 
 
N 
Non-Linear Voting Rights  
(%) 
Existence of  
Non-voting 
Preference Shares (%) 
 
    
<=1850s 102 68.6 6.9 
1860s 288 58.7 5.9 
1870s 145 31.0 15.2 
1880s 132 29.5 22.7 
1890s 47 19.1 42.6 
 
   
Total 714 46.5 13.4 
    
Source: see text. 
Notes: Non-Linear Voting Rights penalise large investors and make voting rights relatively more disperse than 
capital.  The way in which this could be achieved would be to have a graduated voting scale or a cap on the 
maximum number of votes in the hands of any individual shareholder. 
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Table 9.  Average capital and voting concentrations by voting structures 
             
Voting structures  % held by 
insiders 
 
% held by 
largest 5 investors  
Herfindahl Index (%) 
              
Voting rights  
non-linear 
 
Existence of  
non-voting 
preference shares 
 
 
N Capital Votes  N Capital Votes 
 
N Capital Votes 
 
 
 
   
 
       
No No  236 19.0 19.4  307 27.6 27.8  307 4.3 4.4 
Yes No  223 17.3 10.2  313 25.5 14.4  313 3.6 1.9 
No Yes  50 20.3 28.8  52 28.6 37.0  52 4.3 9.9 
Yes Yes  11 13.2 14.0  13 19.4 17.0  13 2.2 2.9 
 
 
            
 Overall  520 18.3 16.3  685 26.5 22.2  685 4.0 3.6 
              
Source: see text. 
Notes: The first row is usually a basic one-vote-per-share or x-votes-per-share arrangement with no preference shares. The small difference between capital and voting 
concentration is that for some companies it may have been one vote for five shares, so anyone holding four shares did not get a vote, those holding nine shares only got one 
vote etc.. Insiders are defined as directors, or owners with more than 10 per cent of capital.  The Herfindahl Index is the sum of the squared proportion of capital owned by 
each investor in a company.  The sample in this table is restricted to companies where both capital and voting data available. 
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Table 10.  Regression results 
 Capital concentration  Voting concentration  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables % held by 
Insiders 
% held by 
5 largest 
investors 
Herfindahl 
Index 
 % held by 
Insiders 
% held by 
5 largest 
investors 
Herfindahl 
Index 
Number of 
shareholders 
 
         
OwnershipDate -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.022***  -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
EstablishmentDate 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.020***  0.019*** 0.019*** 0.022*** -0.005** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Size 0.047 0.027 0.025  0.046 -0.018 -0.002 0.361*** 
 (0.054) (0.033) (0.058)  (0.056) (0.040) (0.059) (0.039) 
ParValue 0.001 0.002 0.002  0.002 0.004 0.003 -0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Uncalled -0.001 -0.003* -0.003  0.000 -0.004* -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
OfficialListing 0.120 0.009 0.132  0.085 0.113 0.183 -0.241** 
 (0.175) (0.093) (0.158)  (0.145) (0.100) (0.143) (0.107) 
NumMarkets -0.309*** -0.101*** -0.202***  -0.256*** -0.126*** -0.226*** 0.173*** 
 (0.055) (0.032) (0.055)  (0.052) (0.040) (0.055) (0.032) 
HeadLondon -0.488*** -0.149* -0.183  -0.451*** -0.235** -0.190 0.143 
 (0.156) (0.085) (0.144)  (0.134) (0.097) (0.128) (0.119) 
Scottish -0.191* -0.189*** -0.219*  -0.142 -0.228** -0.117 -0.133* 
 (0.114) (0.073) (0.118)  (0.127) (0.100) (0.120) (0.075) 
LocalMiles 0.002** 0.001 0.001*  0.002** -0.000 0.002** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
NumDirectors 0.027* -0.050*** -0.064***  0.035** -0.051*** -0.064*** 0.043*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.017)  (0.015) (0.012) (0.017) (0.013) 
DirectorQualPoundsScale 0.372*** 0.222*** 0.344***  0.429*** 0.239*** 0.368*** -0.253*** 
 (0.082) (0.054) (0.081)  (0.087) (0.067) (0.089) (0.068) 
NonVotePreference -0.003 -0.111 -0.188  0.075 0.058 0.127 0.137 
 (0.167) (0.091) (0.167)  (0.146) (0.085) (0.140) (0.085) 
VotingNonLinear -0.031 -0.018 -0.009  -0.552*** -0.713*** -0.711*** 0.041 
 (0.093) (0.054) (0.093)  (0.092) (0.070) (0.095) (0.053) 
IndustryMines 0.123 0.056 -0.096  0.176 0.045 -0.071 0.302* 
 (0.249) (0.130) (0.214)  (0.235) (0.145) (0.214) (0.169) 
IndustryUtility -0.091 -0.049 -0.108  0.229 0.110 0.067 -0.007 
 (0.195) (0.119) (0.219)  (0.165) (0.112) (0.194) (0.105) 
IndustryFinancial -0.378*** -0.225*** -0.429***  -0.315*** -0.236*** -0.394*** 0.275*** 
 (0.101) (0.066) (0.116)  (0.108) (0.080) (0.110) (0.068) 
IndustryBreweries -0.327 0.099 0.096  0.171 0.129 0.196 -0.207 
 (0.320) (0.133) (0.259)  (0.295) (0.129) (0.273) (0.223) 
Merged 0.231** 0.105* 0.179*  0.284*** 0.127* 0.218** -0.010 
 (0.102) (0.059) (0.106)  (0.101) (0.067) (0.104) (0.065) 
CourtWoundup 0.360* 0.196* 0.362*  0.435** 0.274* 0.351 -0.217 
 (0.208) (0.117) (0.200)  (0.219) (0.163) (0.217) (0.145) 
DefunctYear 0.003 0.001 0.003  0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Constant -4.553 -5.644 -7.296  -14.349 -12.641 -16.460 -21.234*** 
 (11.160) (6.857) (11.402)  (11.115) (8.347) (11.360) (7.420) 
         
Observations 421 436 436  456 472 472 472 
R-squared 0.275 0.434 0.377  0.335 0.567 0.463 0.534 
Notes: All the dependent variables are in log form so as to make them closer to being normally distributed.  Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses, and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firm-years where there were director qualifications but where 
less than 80% of directors held shares have been removed from columns (1) and (4).  In addition, we removed one outlier, 
which had a par value of £1,000.  If data on certain variables that were unlikely to change over time (i.e., establishment date, 
head office, number of markets where shares were traded, and director qualifications) were missing for a particular time 
period, but were available for that company for another time, we assumed the value remained the same. We ran robustness 
checks without this assumption, which reduced the number of observations, but our regression results remained the same. 
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Appendix Table 1.  Variable definitions 
Variable Description Data sources 
CourtWoundup A binary variable which equals 1 if the final status of 
company was that it was wound up by a court, 0 otherwise 
RDC, L&EG 
DefunctYear The year the company eventually became defunct 
 
RDC, L&EG 
DirectorQualScale Shareholding requirement for directors scaled by total paid-
up capital 
AoA, SEOI, BOI 
EstablishmentDate 
 
Year in which company was established AoA, SEOI, BOI 
HeadLondon A binary variable which equals 1 if company has a head 
office in London, 0 otherwise 
AoA, SEOI, BOI 
IndustryBreweries A binary variable which equals 1 if company is a brewery, 
0 otherwise 
AoA, SEOI, BOI 
IndustryFinancial A binary variable which equals 1 if company is in financial 
sector, 0 otherwise 
AoA, SEOI, BOI 
IndustryMines A binary variable which equals 1 if company is in mining 
industry, 0 otherwise 
AoA, SEOI, BOI 
IndustryUtility A binary variable which equals 1 if company is a utility, 0 
otherwise 
AoA, SEOI, BOI 
LocalMiles The distance (in miles) between a company’s head office 
and the main market where its shares are traded 
AoA, IMM, SEOI, BOI, 
Google maps 
Merged A binary variable which equals 1 if the final status of 
company was that it merged, 0 otherwise 
RDC 
NonVotePreference A binary variable which equals 1 if company has non-
voting preference shares, 0 otherwise 
AoA, SEOI, BOI 
NumDirectors 
 
The number of directors on the board AoA, SEOI, BOI, SEY 
NumMarkets The number of stock markets where a company’s shares are 
traded 
IMM, SEOI, BOI 
OfficialListing A binary variable which equals 1 if company is listed on 
the Official List, 0 otherwise 
SEOI, BOI 
OwnershipDate 
 
Year in which ownership census was taken Form E ownership returns 
Scottish A binary variable which equals 1 if company is Scottish, 0 
otherwise 
Form E ownership returns 
Size Natural log of company par (paid-up) value  Form E ownership 
returns, SEOI, BOI 
Uncalled Difference between nominal capital and paid-up capital i.e., 
the amount of capital that a shareholder is liable for 
IMM, SEOI, BOI 
VotingNonLinear A binary variable which equals 1 if company has non-linear 
voting scheme, 0 otherwise 
AoA, SEOI, BOI 
   
Notes: AoA = Articles of Association; BOI = Burdett’s Official Intelligence; IMM = Investor’s Monthly 
Manual; L&EG = London and Edinburgh Gazettes; RDC = Register of Defunct Companies; SEOI = Stock 
Exchange Official Intelligence; SEY = Stock Exchange Yearbook. 
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Appendix Table 2.  Summary statistics of regression variables 
 
N Mean 
Standard 
deviation Min Median Max 
Dependent variables       
InsiderCapital (%) 421 16.52 15.87 0.84 10.95 94.68 
Largest5Capital (%) 436 23.62 15.40 1.95 19.63 96.86 
HerfindahlCapital (%) 436 3.21 5.31 0.13 1.53 38.42 
InsiderVotes (%) 456 15.21 17.39 0.58 8.77 100.00 
Largest5Votes (%) 472 21.25 17.72 0.24 16.53 100.00 
HerfindahlVotes (%) 472 3.39 8.43 0.05 1.29 100.00 
NumShareholders 472 476.24 420.96 14.00 352.00 3525.00 
       
Independent variables       
CourtWoundup 472 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.00 1.00 
DefunctYear 472 1914 20 1868 1909 1968 
DirectorQualScale 472 0.40 0.50 0.00 0.25 5.00 
EstablishmentDate 472 1870 17 1820 1873 1899 
HeadLondon 472 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
IndustryBreweries 472 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 
IndustryFinancial 472 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
IndustryMines 472 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.00 1.00 
IndustryUtility 472 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LocalMiles 472 11.31 50.49 0.00 0.00 498.00 
Size 472 11.97 0.97 7.53 11.92 14.60 
Merged 472 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
NonVotePreference 472 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 
NumDirectors 472 6.09 2.68 2.00 6.00 30.00 
NumMarkets 472 1.43 0.84 1.00 1.00 7.00 
OfficialListing 472 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
OwnershipDate 472 1889 9 1864 1890 1902 
Par 472 9.48 12.26 0.15 7.00 100.00 
ParWages 472 0.16 0.22 0.00 0.12 1.81 
Scottish 472 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Uncalled 472 8.45 18.12 0.00 0.69 97.50 
VotingNonLinear 472 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
       
Notes: Summary statistics for dependent variables are reported in their unlogged form. 
 
